Carmel Cacopardo

During the past days and weeks, we have been bombarded by persistent rumors on the possibility of an early election. At the time of writing, these have intensified. Different dates have been mentioned. At the end of the day nothing is certain, except that the dissolution of Parliament and the announcement of the general election date could be imminent.

Parliament still has approximately one year of its legal five-year term unexpired at this point in time.

The Prime Minister can advise the President to dissolve Parliament and call a general election whenever he deems fit. A discretion which was utilized by his predecessors many a time. It is an essential element of the power of incumbency inbuilt in the Constitution.

Should the Prime Minister have the discretion to advise on the early dissolution of Parliament?  This was one of the prerogatives of Kings and Queens which has been inherited by Heads of Government. Since independence this right has been passed on from the Governor-General’s office, as representative of the British Monarch, to the Office of the Prime Minister. It is now the Prime Minister’s prerogative in Malta to advise the Head of State that Parliament be dissolved and that a general election be called.

Why would the Prime Minister call an early election? His sanctimonious reply, earlier this week was that polling day is determined when it is in the national interest. But is it so? Time and again it is clear that no such national interest exists. In reality it is always a political calculation to avoid or at least minimize political risks and to maximise perceived political advantages. It is always the interest of the party currently in government which prevails, never the national interest. If the political risks recede, the likelihood of an early election disappears. Likewise, if the possible advantages become more likely, then in true Machiavellian style the possibility of an early election becomes much more possible.

My party had brought this specific matter to the attention of the Constitutional Convention, which convention is currently in a prolonged state of hibernation. It has been just over six years now since proposals were submitted to President George Vella, and I can reasonably conclude that there is no political will to discuss them.

The fourth proposal (out of 31) submitted by my party to the Constitutional Convention in October 2019 emphasises that the length of the Parliamentary term should be fixed and that it should only be regulated directly by Parliament itself, and this in extraordinary circumstances. This is a provision similar to that agreed to by the Liberal-Conservative Coalition in the United Kingdom’s House of Commons in 2011, around fifteen years ago.

Nick Clegg, then Liberal leader and UK Deputy Prime Minister, had, in piloting the relevant legislation in the House of Commons, described such a move stripping Prime Ministers of the power to pick election dates to maximise party advantage as a profound reform. He had then emphasised that such a reform was essential to restore faith in politics.

We are also aware that in the United States, the term of holders of political office is also fixed. In addition, in the United States, the date of elections is clearly written down in the US Constitution.

Having a fixed term Parliament is not the only reform Parliament urgently requires. We also need fulltime MPs and probably less of them. A fulltime member of parliament would cut off completely all of his/her links with his/her profession and/or employment and as a result substantially reduce instances of conflict of interest.

Parliament’s present size of 65 members was determined as a result of the 1974 Constitutional amendments. Since 1987, it is however not a definite size, as it has been increased as a result of the constitutional adjustment mechanism for proportionality. It was further increased as a result of the 2022-constitutional gender balance requirements.

The electoral system, which the two parties currently in parliament have been tinkering with for ages, provides for proportionality and gender balance only if just two parties are elected into Parliament. If a third party is elected, both the constitutional provisions for proportionality and gender balance will not be activated. There is just one exception and this is relative to the political party which obtains more than 50 per cent of the votes on a national level: in such an instant, irrespective of the number of political parties making it to Parliament the party having an absolute majority of votes is ensured of having the parliamentary seats required for governing.

There are a number of alternative solutions available which make it possible for our Parliament to be both gender-balanced and proportional in its representation without any increase in its size. These solutions have however been completely discarded as the “reform” brief was always to change as little as possible.

Such is the state of our parliament. It needs a complete overhaul, which is long overdue.  The imminent general election is another opportunity to start the process of ensuring that Parliament is truly representative.

Carmel Cacopardo is ADPD-The Green Party’s Deputy Chairperson

Published in The Malta Independent on Sunday: 12 April 2026